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DISSENTS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
THE HONORABLE HELEN WILSON NiEs*
Congress created the Federal Circuit and established this court in
1982 in response to the need for uniformity in certain important
areas of the law, including patent law. However, in enacting our
primary jurisdiction-granting statute,' Congress made clear that it was
not creating a "specialized court," and it specified widely divergent
areas of law or tribunals over which we exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Although our subject matterjurisdiction is more limited
than that of other circuits, our geographic jurisdiction is unbounded
and spans the entire nation to effect the goal of uniformity.
Because of this jurisdictional scheme, the Federal Circuit is unique
among the thirteen federal courts of appeals. Due to overlapping
areas of jurisdiction, our sister circuit courts may develop differing
views on the law. These "intercircuit conflicts" are a frequent trigger
for Supreme Court review. When the Supreme Court grants certiorari
to resolve an intercircuit conflict, the Court has the benefit of a
thoughtful discourse on the conflict in majority opinions. In the
areas in which this court exercises exclusive jurisdiction, this tradition-
al type of intercircuit debate cannot arise. Thus, the presentation of
a conflict in judicial positions on a particular issue of law within our
exclusive jurisdiction can develop only through a dissent from a
member of our court.
It has been suggested that the court should speak with "one voice"
and that dissents are a disservice to the court because they erode the
court's uniform position. I disagree. Under the operating proce-
dures of our court, a later panel is bound to follow the law as set
forth in a prior decision of another panel. The first decision on a
legal issue (not the last) is the binding precedent of our court. This
* ChiefJudge Emeritus, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994).
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procedure prevents intracircuit conflict theoretically but not in reality.
Because our precedent can be overturned only in banc, which is
difficult logistically, a later panel that disagrees with an earlier panel's
analysis as applied to its case may skirt around the issue with
unhelpful generalities. Or a later panel may inadvertently conflict
with an earlier opinion. That can happen. A sentence or two may be
missed or not remembered from an earlier case. Neither type of
second decision tackles the problem in a meaningful way. Only in a
dissent can the issue be fully and intellectually addressed.
In the seven cases this term in which the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to the Federal Circuit, all but one involved
thoroughly developed dissents to the majority opinion. I have no
doubt that the dissents provided an impetus for Supreme Court
review. Judges disputing a point more likely will pique the Court's
interest than lawyers disputing a point.
One area of law the Justices have taken an interest in of late is that
of the role of the jury in patent trials. All three patent cases discussed
below raise questions respecting the jury's function. This is a
welcome development, at least in my mind. Some panels of our court
have been extremely deferential to jury verdicts while other panels
require the trial judge to play a large role in deciding the case despite
the presence of ajury. Only a pronouncement by the Supreme Court
can settle this long-standing split among the judges.
The first case, In re Lockwood,2 revolved around the right to a jury
trial on the issue of patent validity in a declaratory judgment action.
Lockwood's complaint alleged that American Airlines' reservation
system infringed his patents and demanded a jury trial. American
counterclaimed for a declaration of noninfringement and patent
invalidity. After granting American's summary judgment motion of
noninfringement, the court proceeded to consider the invalidity
issues. On American's motion, the district court struck Lockwood's
demand for a jury, concluding that "the remaining claims [for
declaratory relief] are equitable in nature [and] the plaintiff is not
entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right."'
Lockwood then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus
directing the district court to reinstate his demand for ajury trial. In
a nonprecedential Order, a panel of the Federal Circuit directed the
2. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub norm. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 115
S. Ct. 274 (1995).
3. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 969 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. American Airlines,
Inc. v. Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 274 (1995).
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district court to conduct the trial with a jury.' American filed a
combined petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing in
banc. The panel granted rehearing and entered a precedential Order
again instructing the court to reinstate Lockwood'sjury demand. The
panel concluded that because the issue of validity was not purely
equitable and that the pending declaratory judgment action was most
comparable to an inverted patent infringement action, the Seventh
Amendment entitled Lockwood to a jury trial on the issue of the
validity of his patents.' This was the first pronouncement of our
court that the Seventh Amendment compelled ajury trial on the issue
of patent validity.
I disagreed with the position taken by the panel, and I dissented to
the denial of the suggestion for rehearing in banc, with Chief Judge
Archer and Judge Plager joining.6 Although such a dissent is
unusual, it is the only way for a nonpanel member to express a
position in a case that is not taken in banc. In my dissent, I ex-
plained the three reasons underlying my strong belief that patent
validity is an issue of law for the judge alone. First, patent validity
involves public rights, and Supreme Court precedent holds that the
Seventh Amendment does not apply to public rights determinations.
Second, a declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity does not
present a situation in which a party historically had a right to ajury
trial.' Last, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that patent
validity is an ultimate question of law, and under general federal
jurisprudence, the court, not the jury, decides that type of question.
Upon issuance of the order, American Airlines petitioned the
Supreme Court for review. Once review was granted, the patentee
moved, both in the Supreme Court and in the district court, to
withdraw his demand for ajury. Neither the Supreme Court nor the
district court acted on the patentee's motions, but the case quickly
ended at the Supreme Court. The Court issued a brief order vacating
the judgment of the Federal Circuit, remanding the case back to the
district court (skipping over our court) and directing that court "to
4. Id. at 980.
5. Id at 966-80.
6. 1&. at 980-90 (NiesJ., dissenting).
7. As explained'in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987), "First, we compare
the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger
of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether
it is legal or equitable in nature." Regarding the first prong of the test, in 18th-century England,
patent nullification was accomplished through a scirefadaswrit in equity. Regarding the second
and more important prong, all that remained before our court was the declaratory judgment
for invalidity or unenforceability, and neither carries any right to damages. Thus, the remedy
sought was not legal but equitable, and, on this ground alone, no jury fight attached.
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proceed."' The Supreme Court did not vacate the district court's
decision denying Lockwood a right to ajury. I puzzled over what that
action meant and have concluded, reluctantly, that it probably does
not provide support for my position onjuries even though there is no
doubt that further proceedings were without a jury.
The second case taken by the Supreme Court involving patent jury
trials is the Markman case.9 The case began as a run-of-the-mill
infringement action in which Markman alleged that Westview
infringed Markman's patent directed to a dry cleaning inventory
control and reporting system. Resolution of the case turned on the
meaning of the claim term "inventory." Prior to disposition by the
panel assigned to the case, Chief Judge Archer, Judge Rich, and
myself, the case was taken in banc. In a majority decision written by
the Chief'Judge in which the other members of the panel joined, the
majority held that the interpretation and construction of patent
claims is a matter of law exclusively for the court and not the jury.
The majority noted that it could find no authority from 18th-century
English law supporting the proposition that construction of this type
of document was a matter for the jury." The holding that claim
construction, like construction of a statute, was a matter for the court,
in the majority's view, preserved the limited role of the jury in
infringement actions as it was in 1791.
Judge Newman, in dissent, characterized the majority's holding as
one that raised a constitutional issue of "grave consequence.""
According to this dissent, the meaning and scope of disputed
technological and other terms of art are classic questions of fact, and
the correct resolution of these disputes is more likely to be achieved
by the trial process than by the appellate process. The dissent also
believed that because infringement actions in 18th-century England
were tried to ajury, the majority improperly discarded the jury right.
Markman's petition for a writ of certiorari was granted, and a
unanimous Supreme Court resolved the "intracircuit conflict" in favor
of the majority's view."2 The Court explained that although there
was no dispute that infringement actions must be tried to ajury, the
question was whether a particular issue arising within ajury trial (that
8. American Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29, 29 (1995).
9. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.) (in banc), cert. granted,
116 S. Ct. 40 (1995).
10. Id. at 984.
11. Id. at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting).
12. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996). See also United States
Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1562 (1996) (vacating Federal Circuit'sjudgment and
remanding for further consideration in light of Markman).
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is, the construction of a patent claim) is ajury issue. 3 Agreeing with
the Markman majority, the Court could find no direct 18th-century
analogue to claim construction. In such a situation, the Court
reasoned, it is proper to seek the best analogy between claim
construction and an earlier practice whose allocation to judge or jury
is known. The Court reasoned that the closest 18th-century analogue
to modem day claim construction was the construction of a patent
specification, a duty the Court concluded fell to the judge. 4 The
Court also consulted existing precedent and "functional consider-
ations" such as who was the better judicial actor for the task at
hand. 5 Because of the need for uniformity of decision on this issue,
the Court concluded that the better decision maker was the judge,
not the jury.16 While the majority prevailed, Judge Newman's dissent
performed the extraordinary service of delineating a scholarly basis
for disagreement. Without a dissent to point out that factual issues
were involved, we would not have had such a clear directive by the
Supreme Court that the trial judge must decide any underlying issues
of fact en route to determining what a claim means.
The third patentjury case taken by the Supreme Court, Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., is still pending." Ajury found
that Warner-Jenkinson's ultrafiltration process infringed Hilton Davis'
patent under the doctrine of equivalents." The Federal Circuit, sua
sponte, ordered rehearing in banc before issuance of a panel
decision. The issue over which members of the court disagreed was
the proper role of the jury in determining infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.19 The court issued a total of five separate
opinions. The opinion that held that the jury alone decides the issue
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents secured a majority
of six judges. Five judges joined three vigorous dissents.
Judge Plager's dissent recognized that the doctrine is ajudge-made
exception to statutory mandates.0 Characterizing infringement
under the doctrine as being a uniquely equitable remedy, this
dissenter logically concluded that such an equitable decision is the
province of the judge.2 1 The dissent of Judge Lourie similarly would
13. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1386.
14. Id. at 1386-87.
15. Id. at 1395.
16. Id.
17. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
18. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(in banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
19. Id. at 1522.
20. Id. at 1536-45 (PlagerJ., dissenting).
21. Id. at 1540 (PlagerJ., dissenting).
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place the decision on applicability of the doctrine in the hands of the
court, not the jury.
22
I authored the third dissent. After tracing the doctrine through
Supreme Court precedent, I became convinced that the determina-
tion of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents presents a
series of questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact, and that the
scope of protection, that is, how far a claim extends beyond its words,
is a question of law for the trial judge.3 With respect to a claim to
a combination of elements, only the purely factual issue of equivalen-
cy of the components of the accused device to the elements of the
claim, in my view, is for the jury. The scope of protection of a claim,
the issue in Hilton Davis, seems to me to be indistinguishable from
interpretation of a claim, the issue in Markman. Neither is for the
jury.
The Supreme Court granted Warner-Jenkinson's petition for a writ
of certiorari in February 1996. The importance of a case is often
gauged by the number of amicus briefs filed. Thus far, seventeen
amicus briefs have been filed with the Court. The date for oral
argument has not yet been set. The majority holding is clear while
the dissents provide the Justices with clear alternatives. I have no
doubt that the Supreme Court will benefit from the presentations of
the opposing views held by members of this court in making a
decision the importance of which to patent law is almost unparalleled.
In other fields of law as well, important issues are likely to generate
a dissent. The Hercules case involved a suit by two manufacturers
(collectively Hercules) of the chemical defoliant "Agent Orange."24
The two manufacturers sought indemnification from the government
for their contributions to a fund established in connection with the
settlement of a district court class action tort suit btought against
them and other manufacturers by and on behalf of individuals
exposed to the defoliant during the Vietnam War.
The panel majority of the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Claims Court did not err in granting the government's motion for
summary judgment on each of Hercules' contract-based claims.
2 5
Specifically, the panel rejected Hercules' contention that the
government's superior knowledge gave rise to a contractual obligation
to inform Hercules of the known dangers, and concluded that
22. Id. at 1549 (LourieJ., dissenting).
23. Id. at 1550 (Nies,J., dissenting).
24. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1425
(1995).
25. Id. at 196.
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Hercules' claim of a breach of an implied warranty of specification
failed because causation was lacking-Hercules could not prove
causation because it was protected from liability by the "government
contractor defense." 26 Accordingly, the panel considered Hercules'
contributions to the Fund to have been made voluntarily. The panel
also was not persuaded by Hercules' arguments that the government's
mixing of the dioxins and government-imposed restrictions on
packaging gave rise to recovery under a "reverse warranty" theory. 7
Again, in view of the government contractor defense, Hercules could
not prove causation. Last, the panel rejected the argument that the
government's use of the Defense Production Act ("DPA") 28 to
compel Hercules to produce Agent Orange created an implied-in-fact
obligation to indemnify Hercules for any damages incurred.
The dissent disagreed with the idea that the government contractor
defense precluded proof of causation and with the characterization
of Hercules' contributions as "voluntary."29 Use of the defense in
this case amounted to what the dissent called "unwarranted historical
revisionism."" The dissent also believed that the majority improper-
ly confined the doctrine of superior knowledge and that the language
of the DPA supported the government's liability.
After the panel denied the petition for rehearing and this court
declined the suggestion for rehearing in banc, the Supreme Court
agreed to review the case."1 The Court affirmed the Federal
Circuit's judgment, rejecting Hercules' warranty-of-specifications and
indemnification claims. 2 In particular, the Court concluded that
the inference arising from a warranty of specification (that is, that the
party warrants the capability of performance) does not extend to
third-party claims against the contractor.3 The Court also rejected
Hercules' contention that compelled performance under the DPA
constituted an implied-in-fact agreement to indemnify Hercules.
Statutory provisions permitting a contracting officer to indemnify a
contractor would be entirely unnecessary if an implied agreement to
indemnify could arise from the circumstances of contracting.
26. Id at 198.
27. Md at 202.
28. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170 (1994).
29. Hercues, 24 F.3d at 205 (Plager, J., dissenting).
30. Md at 207 (PlagerJ., dissenting).
31. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1425 (1995).
32. Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996).
33. Id at 987.
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The final case taken by the Supreme Court in 1995 involved the
appeal of a savings and loan company, Winstar Corp.' Winstar
arrived at our doorstep as an appeal by the government from a
decision holding it liable for breach of an implied-in-fact contract
between the government and numerous thrifts, under which it was
held that the thrifts had the right to continue using certain account-
ing procedures. 5 The breach allegedly occurred when Congress,
through passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),36 restricted the use of "super-
visory goodwill" as capital which satisfied the regulatory capital
requirements."
A majority of a panel of the Federal Circuit (including myself as
author) reversed and remanded, concluding, inter alia, (1) that there
was no contract obligating the government to continue the regula-
tions which Congress changed, and (2) that FIRREA's capital reforms
were general and public acts to which the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
applies. 8 One judge dissented from the panel, concluding that the
government was liable under contract law notwithstanding application
of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine. 9 The thrifts' suggestions for in banc
consideration were accepted.
The in banc majority opinion, joined by nine judges, affirmed the
lower court's judgment but on different grounds. The majority
concluded that the government had an express contractual obligation
to permit the thrifts to count supervisory goodwill as a capital asset for
regulatory capital purposes.4" The majority, adopting part of the
lower court's reasoning, rejected application of the Sovereign Acts
Doctrine.
Two judges dissented. I reiterated the views expressed in my earlier
opinion.41 Judge Lourie reasoned that the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
bars recovery on a breach of contract theory.
42
The Supreme Court accepted the case in January of this year, oral
argument was heard on April 24, 1996, and a decision has now been
34. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afld, 116 S. Ct. 2432
(1996).
35. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797, 806 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994).
37. Winstar Corp., 994 F.2d at 806.
38. Id. at 808-09.
39. Id. at 813-19 (Newman, J., dissenting).
40. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afJd, 116 S. Ct. 2432
(1996).
41. Id. at 1551-52 (Nies, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1552 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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rendered against the government accompanied by four opinions. 3
No opinion captured a majority.
Dissents take a great deal of time to prepare. One often wonders
if a dissent is worth the effort, but I am convinced that a judge who
disagrees with the majority must make the effort to write a dissent,
especially here at the Federal Circuit where dissents are virtually the
sole means by which contradicting positions on the law are presented
fully and without personal bias to the Supreme Court. An appellate
panel of three judges should never be constrained to speak with one
voice. Although majority opinions have fared well so far this year at
the Supreme Court, as ChiefJustice Rehnquist told us at our Judicial
Conference in May, "Stay tuned." The adage, "Today's dissent is
tomorrow's majority," may play itself out before the year is through.
43. Winstar Corp. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
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